Bargaining, negotiation and persuasion — the three families from the GLEE economic-games
benchmark. You play a human seat against a lightweight stand-in for the agent's strategy. Nothing is sent
anywhere; it all runs in your browser.
Bargaining
Negotiation
Persuasion
Alternating offers over a shrinking pot (Rubinstein). Each round a deal is worth
less: a gain of g agreed in round r pays g·δr−1. You open with an
offer; reject and the roles swap. Reach the round cap with no deal and both get nothing. The agent plays
near the sub-game-perfect split and concedes fast, because waiting is expensive.
You are the buyer; the agent is the seller. The item is worth more to you than
it costs the seller — the gap is the surplus you split. Prices only: accept, or counter with your own price.
No deal pays nothing to either side, so the last mover holds the power. The seller anchors high, then
concedes toward a split, and never sells below cost.
You are the buyer; the agent is the seller, over 20 rounds. Each round the
seller has one item, good (worth the value shown) with the stated probability, otherwise worthless. Only
the seller sees the quality; it sends a recommendation, then you decide whether to buy at the fixed price.
You only learn an item's quality if you buy it. The seller plays the Kamenica–Gentzkow scheme:
it recommends every good item, and lies about a bad one just often enough that following its advice is
still, on average, worth the price — its edge is your trust.
A companion to the write-up on the agent. The opponent here is a compact heuristic, not the
competition agent itself.